We propose a general system that combines the powerful features of modal logic and many-sorted reasoning. Its algebraic semantics leads to a many-sorted generalization of boolean algebras with operators, for which we prove the analogue of the Jónsson-Tarski theorem. Our goal was to deepen the connections between modal logic and program verification, and we test the expressivity of our system by defining a small imperative language and its operational semantics.
Introduction
In this paper we define a many-sorted polyadic modal logic, together with its corresponding algebraic theory. The idea is not new: in [14, 15] two-sorted systems are analyzed and we used them as references for our approach, while in [7, 9, 13 ] a general theory is developed in a coalgebraic setting. However, to our knowledge, the general framework presented in this paper is new.
Our language is determined by a fixed, but arbitrary, many-sorted signature and a set of many-sorted propositional variables. The transition from monosorted to many-sorted setting is a smooth process and we follow closely the developments from [1] . We define appropriate frames and models, the generalized construction of the canonical model and we prove the completeness of our results. The distinction between local and global deduction from the monosorted setting is deepened in our version: locally we consider only hypotheses of the same sort, while globally the set of hypotheses is a many-sorted set. The global deduction is analyzed in a distinct section, where we also prove a corresponding generalization of the deduction theorem. In order to investigate the algebraic completeness, we introduce a many-sorted generalization of boolean algebras with operators and we prove the analogue of Jónsson-Tarski theorem. We mention that similar structures were defined in [7] , but in that case the operators are unary operations while, in our setting, they have arbitrary arities.
While the transition from the mono-sorted logic to a many-sorted one is a smooth process, we see our system as a step towards deepening the connection between modal logic and program verification, and we test its expressivity in the last section.
Our research was inspired by Matching logic [12] , a logic for program specification and verification, in which one can represent the mono-sorted polyadic modal logic. The propositional calculus defined in this paper can be seen as the propositional counterpart of Matching logic.
In Section 2 we follow a standard approach in order to define the canonical model and to prove the completeness theorem. In this section only the local deduction is considered. Section 3 is dedicated to global deduction. Section 4 contains the algebraic semantics. In Section 5 we relate our system with Matching logic and we further compare our approach with similar systems from [15, 14, 2] . Finally, in the last section, we define within our logic, both the syntax and the operational semantics of a small imperative language such that program execution is modeled as logical inference.
The many-sorted polyadic modal logic ML S
In this section we follow closely the development of the polyadic modal logic from [1] . Fixing a many-sorted signature (S, Σ) we investigate the general theory of many-sorted modal logics based on (S, Σ). For these systems we define the syntax, the semantics, the local deduction, the canonical model and we prove the completeness results. Our system is a generalization of the two-sorted modal logic defined in [15] . Some proofs in the paper are straightforward generalizations of the mono-sorted case; however we sketch them in order to keep the paper self-contained.
Formulas, frames and models
Let (S, Σ) be a many-sorted signature. A set of S-sorted variables is an S-sorted set P = {P s } s∈S such that P s = ∅ for any s ∈ S and P s1 ∩ P s2 = ∅ for any s 1 = s 2 in S.
An (S, Σ)-modal language ML (S,Σ) (P ) is built up using the many-sorted signature (S, Σ) and a set of propositional variables P .
In the sequel we assume (S, Σ) and P are fixed. For brevity, ML (S,Σ) (P ) will be denoted ML S . For any n ∈ N we denote [n] := {1, . . . , n} and Σ s1...sn,s = {σ ∈ Σ | σ : s 1 . . . s n → s} for any s, s 1 , . . . , s n ∈ S. Definition 2.1. The set of formulas of ML S is an S-indexed family F orm S = {F orm s } s∈S inductively defined as follows:
• P s ⊆ F orm s for any s ∈ S,
• if φ 1 ∈ F orm s then ¬φ 1 ∈ F orm s for any s ∈ S,
• if φ 1 , φ 2 ∈ F orm s then φ 1 ∨ φ 2 ∈ F orm s for any s ∈ S,
• if σ ∈ Σ s1...sn,s and φ 1 ∈ F orm s1 , . . . , φ n ∈ F orm sn then σ(φ 1 , . . . , φ n ) ∈ F orm s .
As usual, for any s ∈ S, φ 1 , φ 2 ∈ F orm s we set φ 1 ∧ φ 2 := ¬(¬φ 1 ∨ ¬φ 2 ) and φ 1 → φ 2 := ¬φ 1 ∨ φ 2 . For any s ∈ S and a fixed p ∈ P s we define ⊥ s := p ∧ ¬p and ⊤ s = ¬ ⊥ s . Moreover, if σ ∈ Σ s1...sn,s is a non-nullary operation and φ i ∈ F orm si for any i ∈ [n], the dual operation is σ (φ 1 , . . . , φ n ) := ¬σ(¬φ 1 , . . . , ¬φ n ).
In order to define the semantics we introduce the (S, Σ)-frames as S-sorted relational structures. Definition 2.2. An (S, Σ)-frame is a tuple F = (W, R) such that:
• W = {W s } s∈S is an S-sorted set of worlds and W s = ∅ for any s ∈ S,
If F is an (S, Σ)-frame, then an (S, Σ)-model based on F is a pair M = (F , ρ) where ρ : P → P(W) is an S-sorted valuation function such that ρ s : P s → P(W s ) for any s ∈ S. The model M = (F , ρ) will be simply denoted by M = (W, R, ρ).
Following [1] , if C is a set of frames then we say that a model M is from C if it is based on a frame from C.
In the sequel we define the satisfaction relation.
by induction over φ as follows:
We note that:
In this section we study the local deduction, while the global one will be investigated in Section 3. Note that in our sorted setting the local approach implies that the set of hypothesis and the conclusion have the same sort. Therefore we explicitly write the sort in the definition of the local deduction. Definition 2.4. Let s ∈ S, φ ∈ F orm s and assume M is an (S, Σ)-model. We say that φ is universally true in M, and we denote M |
= Φ s is defined as usual. We say that Φ s is satisfiable if there is a model M and w ∈ W s such that M, w | s = Φ s . Assume that C is a class of frames or a class of models. If s ∈ S and Φ s ∪ {φ} ⊆ F orm s then we say that φ is a local semantic consequence of Φ s over C, and we write
model M from C and for any w ∈ W s (we simply denote Φ s | s = φ when C is the class of all frames).
The deductive system
Recall that in our setting any variable uniquely determines its sort, and the sort of a formula is uniquely determined by the sorts of its variables. Consequently, the uniform substitution is S-sorted, meaning that a variable of sort s ∈ S will be uniformly replaced only by a formula of the same sort. Moreover, for any theorem of classical logic, there exists a corresponding one in F orm s for any sort s ∈ S.
We now define K (S,Σ) , a generalization of the modal system K (see [1] the the mono-sorted version). Hence K (S,Σ) = {K s } s∈S is the least S-sorted set of formulas with the following properties:
(a0) for any s ∈ S, if α ∈ F orm s is a theorem in classical logic, then α ∈ K s , (a1) the following formulas are in K s
. ., ψ sn ∈ F orm sn and φ, χ ∈ F orm si .
The deduction rules are Modus Ponens and Universal Generalization:
. ., ψ sn ∈ F orm sn and φ ∈ F orm si (the n-place operator σ is associated with n generalization rules).
Since (S, Σ) is fixed, we simply write K instead of K (S,Σ) .
Definition 2.5. Let Λ ⊆ F orm S be an S-sorted set of formulas. The normal modal logic defined by Λ is KΛ = {KΛ s } s∈S where
In the sequel we assume Λ ⊆ F orm s is an S-sorted set of formulas and we investigate the normal modal logic KΛ. Note that, in our approach, a logic is defined by its axioms. Definition 2.6. Assume that n ≥ 1, s 1 , . . . , s n ∈ S and φ i ∈ F orm si for any i ∈ [n]. The sequence φ 1 , . . . , φ n is a KΛ-proof for φ n if, for any i ∈ [n], ϕ i is in KΛ si or ϕ i is inferred from ϕ 1 , . . . , ϕ i−1 using modus ponens and universal generalization. If φ has a proof in KΛ then we say that φ is a theorem and we write | s KΛ φ where s is the sort of φ.
, ϕ, φ ∈ F orm si and ψ sj ∈ F orm sj for any j ∈ [n]. The following hold:
Remark 2.8. As in the mono-sorted case, the logic KΛ can be defined replacing (K) and (Dual) with
Definition 2.9. If s ∈ S, Φ s ⊆ F orm s and φ ∈ F orm s then we say that φ is locally provable from Φ s in KΛ, and we write
Note that, apart from the usual features of local deduction, in our setting locality also implies all the hypothesis and the conclusion must have the same sort. We can state now the local version of the deduction theorem. The proof is an easy generalization of its analogue from classical logic. 
for any s ∈ S and Φ s ∪ {ϕ, ψ} ⊆ F orm s .
Let C be a class of frames or a class of models and define
We say that KΛ is sound with respect to C if KΛ ⊆ T aut(C).
Proposition 2.11. (The soundness of the local deduction) Let C be a class of frames or a class of models such that
Proof. Let M = (W, {R σ } σ∈Σ , V ) be a model from C. We only prove that the generalization rule (U G i σ ) is sound. To prove this, we assume that σ ∈ Σ s1···sn,s , i ∈ [n] and φ ∈ F orm si such that M, u | si = C φ for any u ∈ W si . Hence for any w ∈ W s and (
. . , ψ n of appropriate sorts.
As a corollary we get: the (S, Σ)-polyadic normal modal logic K is sound with respect to the class of all (S, Σ)-frames.
Canonical model. Completeness.
Following closely the approach from [1] , in order to define the canonical models and to prove the completeness theorem, we need to study the consistent sets.
For any s ∈ S, we say that the set
⊥ s and it is (locally) KΛ-consistent otherwise. In the sequel by consistent we mean locally consistent. We analyze the global consistency in Section 3. Remark 2.12. As in classical logic, one can easily prove the following.
(2) Assume KΛ is sound with respect to C. We further assume s ∈ S and Φ s ⊆ F orm s such that Φ s is satisfiable on some model from C. Then Φ s is KΛ-consistent.
In the sequel we assume C is a class of frames or a class of models.
We say that KΛ is complete with respect to C if T aut(C) ⊆ KΛ. We say that KΛ is strongly complete with respect to C if
The next result is a straightforward generalization of [1, Proposition 4.12].
Proposition 2.13. The following are equivalent: (i) KΛ is strongly complete with respect to C, (ii) any KΛ-consistent set of formulas is satisfiable on some model from C.
As usual, the maximal consistent sets of formulas are a main ingredient in defining the canonical model. In the local approach maximality is defined within a particular sort s ∈ S: a set of formulas Φ s ⊆ F orm s is maximal KΛ-consistent if it is a maximal element in the set of all KΛ-consistent sets of formulas of sort s ordered by inclusion.
Remark 2.14. In the mono-sorted setting, any maximal consistent set is closed to deduction. The same happens in our many-sorted approach: if Φ s ⊆ F orm s is a maximal KΛ-consistent set then
The well-known properties of the maximal consistent sets hold in our setting, as well as the Lindenbaum's Lemma. For any sort s ∈ S, the proof is similar with the proof for the classical propositional logic, therefore we state them without proofs.
Lemma 2.15. If s ∈ S and Φ s ⊆ F orm s is maximal KΛ-consistent then the following properties hold for any ϕ, ψ ∈ F orm s : In order to prove that any consistent set is satisfiable, we define the canonical model. Recall that (S, Σ) is a fixed many-sorted signature, P is an S-sorted set of propositional variables and our logic is KΛ.
|p ∈ w} for any s ∈ S and p ∈ P s .
Lemma 2.18. If s ∈ S, φ ∈ F orm s , σ ∈ Σ s1···sn,s and w ∈ W KΛ s then the following hold:
Proof. Note that (ii) from the above result is the analogue of the Existence Lemma and (iii) is the analogue of the Truth Lemma from [1, Chapter 4.2]. Let s ∈ S, φ ∈ F orm s , σ ∈ Σ s1···sn,s and w ∈ W KΛ s .
(i) Assume that σ ∈ Σ s1···sn,s and let ψ 1 , . . . , ψ n be formulas of sorts s 1 , . . . , s n , respectively. Suppose that R KΛ σ wu 1 . . . u n and σ (ψ 1 , . . . , ψ n ) ∈ w. Assume that ψ i ∈ u i for all i ∈ [n]. Note that u i is a maximal consistent set of sort s i for any i ∈ [n]. By Lemma 2.15 we get ¬ψ i ∈ u i for all i ∈ [n], which means that σ(¬ψ 1 , . . . , ¬ψ n ) ∈ w. Using again Lemma 2.15 it follows that ¬σ(¬ψ 1 , . . . , ¬ψ n ) ∈ w, so σ (ψ 1 , . . . , ψ n ) ∈ w, contradiction with the hypothesis.
For the converse implication, let (ψ 1 , . . . , ψ n ) ∈ u 1 × · · · × u n , and assume that σ(ψ 1 , . . . , ψ n ) ∈ w. Using Lemma 2.15, we infer that ¬σ(ψ 1 , . . . , ψ n ) ∈ w, so σ (¬ψ 1 , . . . , ¬ψ n ) ∈ w. From hypothesis, there is i ∈ [n] such that ¬ψ i ∈ u i . Hence, for some i ∈ [n], ψ i ∈ u i and ¬ψ i ∈ u i , which contradicts the fact that u i is consistent. Consequently, (
(ii) The proof is similar with [1, Lemma 4.26].
(iii) We make the proof by structural induction on φ.
Using the induction hypothesis we get φ i ∈ w i for any i ∈ [n]. Since R KΛ σ ww 1 . . . w n , by definition we infer that φ ∈ w. Conversly, suppose σ(φ 1 , . . . , φ n ) ∈ w. Using (ii), for any i ∈ [n] there is u i ∈ W KΛ si such that φ 1 ∈ u 1 , . . ., φ n ∈ u n and R KΛ σ wu 1 . . . u n . Using the induction hypothesis we get
We can now prove that the local deduction is complete. Proof. Let s ∈ S, Φ ⊆ F orm s a KΛ-consistent set and w ⊆ F orm s a maximal KΛ-consistent set such that Φ ⊆ w. Hence M KΛ , w | s = KΛ φ for any φ ∈ Φ, so Φ is satisfiable over the canonical model.
The above result asserts that, for any Λ ⊆ F orm the normal modal logic KΛ is complete with respect to the canonical model. Proof. It follows by Theorem 2.19 and Proposition 2.13.
Global deduction for ML S
In this section we study the global deduction that is especially relevant in our setting: in this case the set of hypothesis is an arbitrary S-sorted set. Note that for local deduction we use | s and | s = when the set of hypotheses and the conclusion are of sort s ∈ S, while for global deduction we use ⊢ and |= meaning that the set of hypothesis may be an arbitrary S-sorted set (the sort of conclusion is uniquely determined in a particular context). We study the global deduction from a syntactic and semantic point of view, we prove a completeness theorem and a general form of the deduction theorem.
In the following Λ, Γ ⊆ F orm are S-sorted sets of formulas: Λ is the set of axioms and we study the deduction from Γ in KΛ.
we say that M is a model for Γ, and we write M |= Γ.
Let s ∈ S and φ ∈ F orm s . We say that φ is a global semantic consequence of Γ in KΛ, and we write
Let s ∈ S and φ ∈ F orm s . We say that φ is a global sintactic consequence of Γ in KΛ, and we write Γ | KΛ φ, if there exists a sequence φ 1 , . . . , φ n such that φ n = φ and, for any i ∈ [n], φ i ∈ F orm si is an axiom or φ i ∈ Γ si or it is inferred from φ 1 , . . . , φ i−1 using (MP si ) and (UG k σ ) for some σ ∈ Σ t1...tm i ,si and k ∈ [m i ].
One can easily see that the global deduction is sound: Proposition 3.2. For any Γ ⊆ F orm, s ∈ S and φ ∈ F orm s Γ | KΛ φ implies Γ |= KΛ φ Inspired by similar results in the mono-sorted setting (see e.g. [8, Chapter 3 .1]) we analyze the relation between local and global deduction from syntactic point of view. Let Γ ⊆ F orm be an S-sorted set of formulas. We denote Γ G = k Γ k where {Γ k } k is an increasing sequence of S-sorted sets of formulas, defined as follows:
Proposition 3.3. If φ ∈ F orm s for some s ∈ S and Γ ⊆ F orm,
Proof. All deductions are in KΛ, so we simply write | s and | for local and global deduction, respectively. Assume that Γ | φ and let φ 1 , . . . , φ n be a global proof of φ from Γ. We prove that Γ Gs | s φ i by induction on i ≤ n. If i = 1 then φ ∈ Γ s . For the induction step, we analyze only the case when φ i is derived using the deduction rules: Case 1. if φ j = φ k → φ i for some j, k < i then Γ Gs | s φ k and Γ Gs | s φ j ; since the local deduction is closed to modus ponens we get Γ Gs | s φ i ; Case 2. φ i = σ (ψ 1 , . . . , ψ l−1 , φ j , ψ l+1 . . . , ψ m ) for some j < i, σ ∈ Σ and ψ 1 , . . . , ψ m of appropriate sorts. Using the induction hypothesis Γ Gs j | sj φ j , so
The other implication is obvious.
As a direct consequence we get the following. In the sequel we state another form of the deduction theorem. To do this we introduce further notations: for any s ∈ S and ϕ ∈ F orm s we define {ϕ} S by {ϕ} S s = {ϕ} and {ϕ}
Theorem 3.5. (Global deduction theorem II) If ϕ, φ ∈ F orm s for some s ∈ S and Γ ⊆ F orm then the following are equivalent:
Proof. All deductions are in KΛ, so we simply write | s and | for local and global deduction, respectively. We note that Γ ∪ {ϕ} S | {ϕ} G , so (ii) implies (i) is straightforward.
We assume now that Γ ∪ {ϕ} S | φ, so there exists γ 1 , . . . , γ m a global proof of φ from Γ ∪ {ϕ} S . By induction on i ∈ [m] we prove
where s i is the sort of γ i . For m = 1 we consider two cases: Case 1. if γ 1 ∈ Γ or γ 1 is an axiom then the conclusion is obvious;
For the induction step, we only analyze the case when γ i is derived using the deduction rules:
Using Proposition 3.3 we consider local deduction on the sort s i and we can use the theorems of classical propositional logic on s i . It follows that that
. . , ψ m ) where j < i, σ ∈ Σ and ψ 1 , . . . , ψ m have appropriate sorts; using the induction hypothesis and the universal generalization we get
for some ϕ 1 , . . . , ϕ n ∈ {ϕ} G sj where s j is the sort of γ j . Using Proposition 3.3 we consider local deduction on the sort s i of γ i , so we can use Proposition 2.7 and (K l σ ) in order to infer that
and we use again Proposition 3.3 to get the desired conclusion.
In the sequel we make preliminary steps towards proving a global completeness theorem. To do this we define the global consistency as follows: an S-sorted set Γ ⊂ F orm is globally inconsistent in KΛ if Γ | KΛ ⊥ s for some s ∈ S and globally consistent otherwise.
The next definition is a straightforward generalization of [1, Definition 2.5].
σ is the restriction of R σ for any σ ∈ Σ and ρ ′ s (p) = ρ s (p) ∩ W ′ s for any s ∈ S and p ∈ P s . We say that the submodel M ′ is a generated (S, Σ)-submodel of M if for any σ ∈ Σ s1...sn,s
If X ⊆ W is an S-sorted subset, the submodel generated by X is the smallest (with respect to inclusion) generated submodel of M that includes X .
Theorem 3.7. If the S sorted set Γ ⊆ F orm is globally consistent in KΛ, then there exists a model of KΛ that is also a model from Γ.
Proof. We follow the proof of [8, Proposition 3.1.3]. Since Γ is globally consistent in KΛ, by Proposition 3.3, Γ Gs is KΛ-consistent for any s ∈ S, so we define
Note that the global consistency is particularly interesting in a many-sorted setting and it is affected by the way sorts are connected through operations.
Algebraic semantics for ML S
In this section we add an algebraic perspective to our logic. Since the boolean algebras with operators (BAO) and the complex algebras are the structures of the polyadic modal logic, we define their many-sorted versions. Therefore, we introduce the many-sorted boolean algebras with operators and we generalize the Jónsson-Tarski Theorem. In doing this we follow closely [1, Chapter 5] .
Recall that (S, Σ) is a fixed many-sorted signature.
Definition 4.1. An (S, Σ)-boolean algebra with operators ((S, Σ)-BAO) is a structure
where A s = (A s , ∨ s , ¬ s , 0 s ) is a boolean algebra for any sort s ∈ S and, for any σ ∈ Σ s1...sn,s , f σ : A s1 × . . . × A sn → A s satisfies the following properties:
In the above definition, N stands for Normality and A stands for Additivity. The dual operators are defined by f σ (a 1 , . . . , a n ) := ¬ s f σ (¬ s1 a 1 , . . . , ¬ sn a n ) for any a 1 ∈ A s1 , . . . , a n ∈ A sn . An (S, Σ)-BAO can be equivalently defined as a many-sorted structure
satisfying the equations of boolean algebras on any sort. The notions of subalgebra, congruence, homomorphism are defined as in universal algebra. Consequently, if h : A → B is an (S, Σ)-BAO homomorphism then h s : A s → B s are boolean algebra homomorphisms for any s ∈ S.
In the sequel we shall omit the sort when the context is clear. Our main examples are the (S, Σ)-complex algebras and the LindenbaumTarski algebra of ML S .
Example 4.2. (Complex algebras) Let
where, for any σ ∈ Σ s1...sn,s we set m σ : P(W s1 ) × · · · × P(W sn ) → P(W s ) m σ (X 1 , . . . , X n ) = {w ∈ W s | R σ ww 1 . . . w n for some w 1 ∈ X 1 , . . . , w n ∈ X n } and the dual l σ (X 1 , . . . , X n ) := ¬ s m σ (¬ s1 X 1 , . . . , ¬ sn X n ) is defined by w ∈ l Rσ (X 1 , . . . , X n ) iff R σ ww 1 , . . . , w n implies w i ∈ X i for some i ∈ [n].
One can easily see that F is an (S, Σ)-BAO. Definition 4.3. A (S, Σ)-complex algebra is a subalgebra of a full complex algebra determined by an (S, Σ)-frame.
Let A = ({A s } s∈S , {f σ } σ∈Σ ) be an (S, Σ)-BAO. For any s ∈ S let U f (A s ) be the set of all ultrafilters of A s . For any σ ∈ Σ s1...sn,s and w ∈ U f (A s ), w 1 ∈ U f (A s1 ), . . . , w n ∈ U f (A sn ) we define Q fσ ww 1 . . . w n iff for all a 1 ∈ w 1 , . . . , a n ∈ w n , f σ (a 1 , . . . , a n ) ∈ w.
The (S, Σ)-frame Uf (A) = ({U f (A s )} s∈S , {Q fσ } σ∈Σ ) is the ultrafilter frame of A. Denote F(A) the full complex algebra determined by Uf (A).
We are ready now to prove the generalization of the Jónsson-Tarski theorem to (S, Σ)-BAOs. Proof. We only sketch the proof, since it follows closely the proof for the monosorted setting (see [1, Theorem 5 .43]). Let A = ({A s } s∈S , {f σ } σ∈Σ ) be an (S, Σ)-BAO and W = {W s } s∈S , where W s is the ultrafilter set of A s . Using the Stone Representation Theorem we get a morphism r = {r s } s∈S such that r s : A s → P(W s ) is defined by r s (a) = {w ∈ W s |a ∈ w}. Note that r s is a boolean embedding for any s ∈ S. We have to prove that r is an embedding of A into the full complex algebra of its ultrafilter frame, i.e. we have to prove that r is a modal homomorphism: (a 1 , . . . , a n )) = m Q fσ (r s1 (a 1 ), . . . , r sn (a n )) (H) Let w ∈ W s be an ultrafilter of A s . We have to prove that f σ (a 1 , . . . , a n ) ∈ w iff there exist w 1 ∈ W s1 , . . . , w n ∈ W sn such that a i ∈ w i for any i ∈ [n] and Q fσ ww 1 . . . w n . To simplify the notation, we fix the operation σ and we use the notation f instead of f σ . We prove (H) by induction on the arity of f . Assume that f is an unary operator. Therefore, we show that
If w ∈ m Q f (r s1 (a)) there exists w 1 ∈ r s1 (a) such that Q f ww 1 . It follows that a ∈ w 1 and Q f ww 1 , so f (a) ∈ w.
Conversely, assume that w is an ultrafilter such that w ∈ r s (f (a)), i.e. f (a) ∈ w. We need to prove that w ∈ m Q f (r s1 (a)), so we have to find an ultrafilter w 1 such that a ∈ w 1 and Q f ww 1 . If F s1 := {v ∈ A s1 |¬f (¬v) ∈ w} then we prove that F s1 is closed under taking meets. Let v, t ∈ F s1 ⇒ ¬f (¬v) ∈ w and ¬f (¬t) ∈ w. By additivity of f , f (¬v)∨f (¬t) = f (¬v ∨¬t) = f (¬(v ∧t)), hence
Since w is an ultrafilter and ¬f (¬v), ¬f (¬t) ∈ w, we can infer that ¬f (¬(v ∧ t)) ∈ w. We proved that F s1 is closed under taking meets. It follows that the filter generated by F s1 is proper, so there is an ultrafilter w 1 such that F s1 ⊆ w 1 . Note that ¬f (¬v) ∈ w implies v ∈ w 1 , so Q f ww 1 it holds.
Assume that induction hypothesis (H) holds for n and let f de a normal and additive function or arity n + 1. One can further proceed as in [1, Theorem 5.43 ].
Finally, we prove the algebraic completeness of for systems of many-sorted modal logic.
Example 4.5. (The Lindenbaum-Tarski algebra of KΛ) For any s ∈ S the theorems of classical propositional logic are in KΛ s for any s ∈ S and the boolean connectives ∨ and ¬ preserve the sort, so F orm s = (F orm s , ∨, ¬, ⊥ s ) is a boolean algebra. We define f σ (φ 1 , . . . , φ n ) := σ(φ 1 , . . . , φ n ) for any σ ∈ Σ s1...sn,s and φ 1 ∈ F orm s1 , . . . , φ n ∈ F orm sn . One can easily see that
Let KΛ be an (S, Σ)-polyadic normal modal logic defined as in Section 2.2. As usual, KΛ determines an equivalence relation on formulas. In our setting this relation is S-sorted:
By Proposition 2.7 (iv), ≡ KΛ is a congruence relation on Form. We denote L s KΛ := F orm s ≡ s KΛ for any s ∈ S and
. . , φ n )] for any σ ∈ Σ s1...sn,s and φ 1 ∈ F orm s1 , . . . , φ n ∈ F orm sn . Note that L KΛ satisfies (N) and (A) by Remark 2.8.
The (S, Σ)-BAO L KΛ is the Lindenbaum-Tarski algebra of the (S, Σ)-polyadic normal modal logic KΛ.
Our next goal is to prove the algebraic completeness for KΛ. Recall that P = {P s } s∈S is the set of propositional variables. If A = ({A s } s∈S , {f σ } σ∈Σ ) is an (S, Σ)-BAO, then an assignment in A is an S-sorted function e = {e s } s∈S , e s : P s → A s for any s ∈ S. As usual, any assignment can be uniquely extended to e : Form → A, a homomorphism of (S, Σ)-BAOs. We define T aut(A) = {T aut(A) s } s∈S where T aut(A) s = {φ ∈ F orm s | e s (φ) = 1 s in A s for any assignment e s : P s → A s } One can easily prove that KΛ is sound with respect to assignments in (S, Σ)-BAOs. Moreover, the following holds.
Proof. It is a consequence of the fact that, by Definition 2.5, KΛ is closed to S-sorted uniform substitutions.
Conversely, assume that | s KΛ φ and let e be an assignment in L KΛ . For any t ∈ S and propositional variable p ∈ P t there is ψ p ∈ F orm t such that e t (p) = [ψ p ]. We can prove by structural induction that for any t ∈ S and ψ ∈ F orm t , e t (ψ) = [φ ′ ], where ψ ′ is the formula obtained from ψ by uniform substitution, replacing any propositional variable p by ψ p . By Definition 2.5 we infer that KΛ ⊆ T aut(L KΛ ). To finish the proof we note that the deduction rules are sound with respect to assignments in the Lindenbaum-Tarski algebra L KΛ .
Lemma 4.7. If KΛ ⊆ T aut(A) then any assignment e s : P s → A s for any s ∈ S can be uniquely extended to a homomorphism of (S, Σ)-BAOsẽ : L KΛ → A such thatẽ s ([φ]) = e s (φ) for any s ∈ S and φ ∈ F orm s .
Proof. Since KΛ ⊆ T aut(A) we get ≡ KΛ ⊆ Ker(e), so we apply the universal property of quotients.
Theorem 4.8. (Algebraic completeness for KΛ) With the above notations, the following are equivalent for any s ∈ S and φ ∈ F orm s : 
Related logical systems
Traditionally, program verification within modal logic, as showcased by dynamic logic [4] , is following the mainstream axiomatic approach proposed by Hoare/Floyd [6, 3] . More recently, Roşu [12] proposed matching logic and reachability logic as an alternative way to prove program correctness, using directly the (executable) operational semantics of a language. The completeness theorem for matching logic is proved using a interpretation in the first-order logic with equality. The starting point of our investigation was the representation of the (mono-sorted) polyadic modal logic as a particular system of matching logic in [12, Section 8] . Our initial goals were: to understand the propositional part of matching logic, to give a self-contained proof of the completeness theorem, to identify the algebraic theory and to investigate the relation with modal logic. The many-sorted system K is an initial step in this direction.
Matching logic, defined in [12] , is a many-sorted first-order logic for program specification and verification (see Appendix B for a brief presentation). The formulas of Matching logic are called patterns. Semantically, a pattern is interpreted as a set of elements, with the restriction that variables are interpreted as singletons. A sound and complete system of axioms is defined in [12] , the completeness being proved by translation in pure first-order logic with equality. As shown in [12] , classical propositional logic, pure predicate logic, separation logic can be seen as instances of Matching logic. In [12, Section 8] the (monosorted) polyadic modal logic is represented as a particular system of Matching logic. This was the starting point of our investigation.
Let (S, Σ) be a many-sorted signature. A Matching logic
is an (S, Σ)-frame so we consider M = ({P(M s )} s∈S , {m σ } σ∈Σ ) the full complex algebra determined by M. One can easily see that m σ =σ M for any σ ∈ Σ, whereσ M is uniquely defined by σ M (note that in [12, Definition 2.2]σ M is identified with σ M ).
Remark 5.1. To any Matching logic model we can associate an (S, Σ)-frame and vice versa.
Note that the variables of Matching logic are always interpreted as singletons, while our propositional variables have arbitrary values. Let (S, Σ P ) be the signature obtained by adding a constant operation symbol for any propositional variables p ∈ P s and for any s ∈ S. Hence any formula in our (S, Σ)-polyadic modal logic is a formula in Matching logic over (S, Σ P ).
The relation between the many-sorted polyadic modal logic developed in this paper and Matching logic can be summarized as follows:
• the system K presented in this paper can be seen as the propositional counterpart of Matching logic, • the system K offers direct proofs for various types of completeness results, • by Remark 5.1 and Corollary 4.9, the algebraic theory of Matching logic is the theory of many-sorted Boolean algebras with operators, • the variables of Matching logic are similar with the state variables in hybrid modal logic, so our conjecture is that Matching logic can be presented as a hybridized many-sorted polyadic modal logic. This will be the subject of further investigations.
Even if Matching logic was the starting point of our research, one main issue was to connect our logic with already existing systems of many-sorted modal logic.
Example 5.2. In [15] the author defines a sound and complete two-sorted modal logic for projective planes. If we set S = {p, l} (p for points, l for lines), Σ l,p = { 01 } and Σ p,l = { 10 }, [01] := 01 and [10] := 10 then our modal language ML (S,Σ) is the modal language M LG 2 defined in [15] . Moreover, if Λ = {CJ, D l , D p , 4 . , 4 − } from [15, Definition 4.1] then our system KΛ is equivalent with the system AXP from [15] . Consequently, all our general results stand for AXP. 
Here • denotes the composition, ⊗ denotes the converse and Id is the identity, so on the sort p one can define a system of arrow logic. The operation * is the program iteration, while <·> and ? connect programs and statements. In [14] the following deduction rule is considered: if φ → α and α • α → α are provable, then φ * → α is provable. For the moment, our many-sorted modal logic has only modus ponens and universal generalization as deduction rules so one should study what happens when new deduction rules are added. However we notice that using ∆, L, R instead on <·>, ? as suggested in [14, Section 4] one can replace the above deduction rule with the induction axioms for iteration [4, Section 5.5] . Even if more is needed for a complete development, such a system would fit in our setting and would benefit of our general results.
Example 5.4. In [2] , a modal semantics is given for Context logic and Bunched logic, both being logics for reasoning about data structures. These logics are interpreted into a two-sorted polyadic normal modal logic. The sound and complete axiomatization given in [2, Section 3] fit in our development so all our general results stand in this case.
A modal logic approach to operational semantics
In the sequel, we take first steps in exploring the amenability of dynamic logic in particular, and of modal logic in general, to express operational semantics of languages (as axioms), and to make use of such semantics in program verification.
In the remainder of the paper we develop a particular system KΛ which uses dynamic logic in a many-sorted setting. Our goal is to express operational semantics of languages as axioms in this logic, and to make use of such semantics in program verification. As a first step towards that goal, we consider here the SMC Machine described by Plotkin [10] , we derive a Dynamic Logic set of axioms from its proposed transition semantics, and we argue that this set of axioms can be used to derive Hoare-like assertions regarding functional correctness of programs written in the SMC machine language.
The semantics of the SMC machine as laid out by Plotkin consists of a set of transition rules defined between configurations of the form S, M, C where S is a V alueStack of intermediate results, M represents the M emory, mapping program identifiers to values, and C is the ControlStack of commands representing the control flow of the program. Inspired by the Propositional Dynamic Logic (PDL) [4] , we identify the ControlStack with the notion of "programs" in dynamic logic, and use the ";" operator from dynamic logic to denote stack composition. We define our formulas to stand for configurations of the form conf ig(vs, mem) comprising only a value stack and a memory. Similarly to PDL, we use the modal operator [ ] : ControlStack × Conf ig → Conf ig to assert that a configuration formula must hold after executing the commands in the control stack. The axioms defining the dynamic logic semantics of the SMC machine are then formulas of the form cf g → [ctrl]cf g ′ saying that a configuration satisfying cf g must change to one satisfying cf g ′ after executing ctrl. In Fig. 1 we introduce the signature of our logic as a context-free grammar (CFG) in a BNF-like form. We make use of the established equivalence between CFGs and algebraic signatures (see, e.g., [5] ), mapping non-terminals to sorts and CFG productions to operation symbols. Note that, due to nonterminal renamings (e.g., Exp ::= Int), it may seem that our syntax relies on subsorting. However, this is done for readability reasons only. The renaming of non-terminals in syntax can be thought of as syntactic sugar for defining injection functions. For example, Exp ::= Int can be thought of as Exp ::= int2Exp(Int), and all occurrences of an integer term in a context in which an expression is expected could be wrapped by the int2Exp function.
The sorts CtrlStack and Config correspond to "programs" and "formulas" from PDL, respectively. Therefore the usual operations of dynamic logic ;, ∪, * , [ ] are defined accordingly [4, Chapter 5] . We depart from PDL with the definition of ? (test): in our setting, in order to take a decision, we test the top value of the value stack. Consequently, the signature of the test operator is ? : V al → CtrlStack.
We are ready to define our axioms. For the rest of the paper, whenever phi is a theorem of sort s, i.e. | s φ, we will simply write ⊢ φ, since the sort s can be easily inferred.
The first group of axioms is inspired by the axioms of PDL [4, Chapter 5.5]. In the following, π, π ′ are formulas of sort CtrlStack ("programs"), γ is a formula of sort Config (the analogue of "formulas" from PDL), v and v ′ are variables of sort Var, vs has the sort ValStack and mem has the sort Mem.
two completeness results: the completeness with respect to the canonical frame (Theorem 2.19) and the completeness with respect to the class of many-sorted boolean algebras with operators that are models of Λ (Theorem 4.8). The canonical model is a non-standard model with respect to the dynamic logic fragment of our system, meaning that the interpretation of the c * operation might not be the reflexive and transitive closure of the interpretation of c, where c is a formula of sort CtrlStack.
Note that our PDL-inspired set of axioms does not include the induction axiom:
The system presented in this paper can be used to certify executions, but we cannot perform symbolic verification. Adding the induction axiom would not solve this problem, the system should also be extended with quantifiers. Future research will adress this issue.
We conclude by a simple example formalizing and stating a formula which can be proven by deduction in our logic. Let pgm be the following program i1:= 1; i2:= 2; if i1<=i2 then m:= i1 else m:= i2
Note that pgm is a formula of sort Stmt in our logic, m is a formula of sort Var and 1 is a formula of sort Nat. For this formula we can state and prove the following property: Which, can be read in plain English as: after executing pgm the value of the program variable m (in memory) will be 1, and the value stack will be the same as before the execution.
Next we simplify the program pgm to basic commands: In the sequel, we give the main steps of the proof, each proof being a theorem of our KΛ system. Note that T ranz denotes the following easily derived deduction rule:
(T ranz) if | s φ → ψ and | s ψ → χ then | s ψ → χ.
Proof of (P pgm )
(1) conf ig(vs, mem) → [c(1)]conf ig(1 · vs, mem) Aint (2) conf ig(1 · vs, mem) → [asgn(i1)]conf ig(vs, set(mem, i1, 1))
